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ABSTRACT  
 
Disasters represent disruptions to stability and offer lessons about how climate 
adaptation is negotiated and acted on. Viewing adaptation as a negotiation helps 
understand recovery not just as actions taken to minimize harm, but a reflection of values 
and motivations surrounding adaptation. This research elicits these perspectives and 
considers them as part of an ongoing agreement for disaster recovery and adaptation in 
Puerto Rico. Previous research has characterized recovery as an opportunity for 
rethinking societal arrangements for climate adaptation and highlights the importance of 
how adaptation is conceptualized across actors. This study builds on past research by 
using distinct perspectives to understand recovery as an adaptation process and a co-
production of a new ‘social contract’ after Hurricane Maria. Community interviews and 
government documents are analyzed to understand who is involved, where change is 
happening, and what resources are necessary for success. The purpose of this is to 
consider distinct framings of recovery and adaptation, and what these contribute to long-
term change. Community interviews give a perspective of local stability and show 
capacities for immediate and long-term recovery. Similarly, government documents 
discuss managing foundational vulnerabilities like infrastructure, while navigating 
recovery given geographical and economic obstacles.  
Findings show that self-organization and harnessing social capital are crucial 
components of recovery in the Corcovada community after Maria. They rely on bonding 
and bridging social capital to mobilize resources and reducing vulnerabilities for future 
threats. This transformative approach was also present in official recovery documents, 
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though political and economic change were stressed as necessary for stability, along with 
modernizing infrastructure. While recovery documents suggest connecting physical and 
social resilience, community residents have cultivated this connection long before Maria. 
Unlike in Corcovada, the government of Puerto Rico is only starting to view disruptions 
as windows of opportunity and therefore mention plans for transformation but don’t 
present actions taken. Further, the reality of vulnerable infrastructural, political and 
economic systems greatly affects recovery both in Corcovada and across the island. Both 
perspectives will likely affect actions taken in Puerto Rico and recognizing these unique 
framings of stability can help design transformative, adaptive social contracts for facing 
future threats.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Major disasters present opportunities to learn about how societies adapt to climate change. 
These events call into question how a population achieves stability, or at least survives, a massive 
destruction of critical services and infrastructure. Some research in disasters has begun to 
conceive such disruptions not just as opportunities to learn about bouncing back after recovery, 
but also a chance to learn about bouncing forward, or emerging stronger (Berkes & Campanella, 
2006; Cretney, 2016; Brundiers, 2016). Taking disasters as lessons about climate adaptation 
means considering major vulnerabilities and capacities to understand how stability is achieved 
and how underlying conditions can be improved to spur fundamental change. That said, disasters 
are critical junctures where societies must evaluate and negotiate adaptation actions, which 
involves challenging and perhaps even changing agreements on how to prepare for disasters 
(Pelling & Dill, 2010). Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico exemplifies a pivotal moment for the 
island as recovery continues to be negotiated and political agreements around climate adaptation 
come into question. This case represents an opportunity to learn not only about coordinating 
recovery in the face of disasters, but more generally about how long-term adaptation is 
conceptualized across governing institutions and citizens. Finally, recovery and long-term 
adaptation will be negotiated not only between citizens and the government, but also in 
coordination with the federal government as it is an unincorporated territory of the United States. 
 Impacts of a disaster are known to be produced by several factors, including unsafe conditions 
and root causes (Wisner et al., 2004). In Puerto Rico, vulnerabilities that pre-dated Maria will 
have to be considered in long-term recovery, such as economic instability and weak infrastructure 
(Vives, 2017). In addition, the island’s capacity for recovery, both physical and organizational, 
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will have to be considered as well as which capacities should be enhanced to ensure stability or 
enable desirable transformations after Maria. Resilience is a commonly used lens with which 
disaster recovery is examined and is used here to understand recovery by exploring connections 
between built and social systems and how populations organize to achieve successful adaptation 
(Vale & Campanella, 2005). Both adaptation literature as well as disaster research have pointed to 
resilience to understand how to improve both human and non-human systems to face uncertainties 
(Tierney & Bruneau, 2007; Pelling, 2011). While resilience is used here to understand the 
connections between built and social systems, this research reaches beyond the concept to 
understand recovery and adaptation outcomes after Hurricane Maria not just as a ‘resilient’ but as 
a process of transformation and fundamental change. Further, viewing climate adaptation as 
process of increasing resilience or enabling transformation requires taking stock of perspectives 
that influence arrangements on maintaining well-being in the face of major ecological change 
(O’Brien et al., 2009). In recognizing the diverse perspectives at play in adaptation, this research 
uses the concept of negotiation to frame the ongoing discussions on recovery, long-term stability, 
and climate adaptation in Puerto Rico. To do this, perspectives of a local community and the 
overarching perspective of the government of Puerto Rico are elicited through qualitative 
interviews and key recovery documents on recovery. Both perspectives will be considered for 
their role in the co-production of an agreement on adaptation, including which actors and 
resources should be involved and what actions will produce change on the island.  The next 
sections outline key discussions in disasters, adaptation, and resilience before presenting research 
questions and how they will be explored using the case of Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Natural disasters have long been the subject of studies on climate change and adaptation 
(Blaikie et al., 1994). The term “natural disaster” has itself been the subject of discussion on 
which conditions actually produce damages and losses associated with extreme events, and if 
these are in fact natural or the result of broader institutional arrangements (Wisner, 2004). 
Further, disaster scholars have been concerned with how vulnerable populations cope with and 
overcome such disasters, especially at a local level (Lopez-Marrero & Wisner, 2012). In 
recognizing that the conditions which contribute to losses and damages from disasters varies 
widely across political and geographical contexts, researchers have concluded that strategies to 
address underlying conditions are equally as diverse and can be shaped by political, social, 
cultural, and economic landscapes (Neef & Shaw, 2013). Studies on vulnerability to disasters, 
capacities for recovery, and resilience of populations are common throughout disaster research 
and are discussed here to show the different ways disasters are experienced and overcome in a 
particular context. In this discussion, disasters are considered not only as the build-up of 
hazardous conditions triggered by extreme events, but as lessons on how people will adapt to the 
continued exposure of climate threats by examining both physical and non-physical 
vulnerabilities. 
Recent research has looked beyond the direct impacts of disaster events and immediate 
response to consider the period of recovery as a pivotal juncture for adaptation (Birkmann & 
Teichman, 2010). Some scholars, for example, suggest that disasters present opportunities for 
rethinking socio-political regimes and the effects these might have on adaptation (Pelling & Dill, 
2010).  Even more, others have begun to consider disasters as actual opportunities to consider 
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new social contracts surrounding climate adaptation (Blackburn & Pelling, 2018). Pelling and Dill 
(2010) suggest that change after a disaster can happen in a way that “accelerates the status quo” or 
contests it (pg. 22). While a variety of institutional arrangements exist to take on the challenges of 
disaster risk reduction (IPCC, 2012), most disaster adaptation strategies do not involve examining 
and altering socio-political and economic regimes that may have exacerbated risk to begin with. 
However, using disasters to understand the broader processes of adaptation can foster a re-
evaluation of these dominant regimes as well as the values and beliefs regarding adaptation that 
are held across individual and institutional actors.  Further, this re-evaluation has been considered 
a window of opportunity to challenge existing institutional structures and dominant ways of 
thinking about adaptation (Birkmann et al., 2009). In addition to examining the conditions that 
produce vulnerabilities to disasters and capacities necessary for successful adaptation, 
understanding the processes of change after disasters can provide insights into the values that 
drive adaptation--and, perhaps, transformation--after disasters. 
 
2.1 Key concepts in disaster and adaptation: vulnerabilities, capacities, and resilience 
Seminal research provides frameworks for understanding the underlying conditions and 
pressures that can produce a disaster. Specifically, Blaikie et al. (1994) define a disaster as a 
function of hazards interacting with root causes, dynamic pressures, and unsafe conditions. The 
event itself exacerbates pre-existing conditions like lack of resources, dangerous locations, and 
macro-forces like climate change. The Pressure and Release (PAR) model suggests that economic 
instability, lack of shared power, and lack of social protections are common foundational 
vulnerabilities that can exacerbate impacts of natural forces (Blaikie et al., 1994). According to 
the authors, pressure from a hazard is placed on vulnerable people and places, and these same 
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populations are on the other hand made more vulnerable by dynamic pressures and root causes. In 
turn, these vulnerabilities affect capacities to cope and adapt to extreme events. Lecheinko and 
O’Brien (2008) also suggest that vulnerabilities are affected by global climatic and political 
processes. In summary, both physical and social vulnerabilities can present challenges for disaster 
recovery and climate adaptation more broadly.  As major disruptors of social and ecological 
stability, disasters present opportunities to reflect on vulnerabilities in the face of extreme events 
and consider them for future adaptation.   
Much like different root causes of vulnerability, adaptive capacities represent many sets of 
conditions that determine successful adaptation (Adger et al., 2011). These capacities involve how 
material and organizational resources are mobilized in the face of a disturbance or a chronic issue. 
Eakin & Lemos (2014) differentiate between “generic” and “specific” capacities in the face of 
climate adaptation. Generic capacities are foundational development needs and specific capacities 
refer to planning for and anticipating threats. For example, generic capacities at individual and 
system levels include material assets, health status, transparency in governance, and participation 
in social organizations. The authors suggest that when populations lack these generic capacities, 
“individuals and communities face chronic, intense stress that undermines human welfare and 
erodes the social fabric that is necessary to manage risk effectively” (pg 4). Specific capacities, on 
the other hand, are focused on reducing the impact of climate stresses and shocks. They can 
include adopting technologies, early warning systems, and disaster planning (Eakin & Lemos, 
2014). While high specific adaptive capacity can decrease loss associated with climate threats, 
considering both types of capacities can best inform adaptation action after a sudden shock in a 
way that addresses both immediate impacts and long-term development.  
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Adger and Vincent (2005) write that “Adaptive capacity has diverse elements 
encompassing the capacity to modify exposure to risks associated with climate change, absorb 
and recover from losses stemming from climate impacts, and exploit new opportunities that arise 
in the process of adaptation” (pg. 400). As seen in research on vulnerability and resilience, 
however, exposure to risk associated with climate change varies widely as do the resources 
available to recover from loss. Therefore, adaptive capacity as it is exhibited at particular level, 
such as a community-scale, may look different than efforts to increase capacity at broader scales. 
For example, bridging organizations and horizontal networks are steps taken at a national and 
international level to increase adaptive capacity (Adger et al., 2005). At a local level, these actions 
might take the form of an inclusive governance structure for decision-making, such as a 
committee of residents who act as community leaders. Community action to increase adaptive 
capacity have been of particular interest to studies in resilience to disasters (Cutter et al., 2008). In 
communities, improvising, learning and acting collectively represent social learning, a key 
capacity in adaptation (Adger, 2003). Research in disaster resilience has further stressed the 
importance of social capital and social networks in reconstruction and recovery. Aldrich (2012) 
writes, “higher levels of social capital--more than such factors as greater economic resources, 
assistance from the government, and low levels of damage-- facilitate recovery and help survivors 
coordinate for more effective reconstruction” (pg. 2). Strong social networks and organization 
have also been cited as factors that contribute to overall resilience, another concept used to 
conceptualize adaptation after a disaster (Carpenter, 2013).  Since resilience has been used to 
examine how groups overcome vulnerability and increase adaptive capacity in the face of disaster 
events, it is useful to also discuss the concept within the broader processes of adaptation. 
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Throughout resilience literature, the term has been used to describe how systems, 
populations, and institutions maintain stability given major uncertainties associated with climate 
shifts (Holling, 2001; Pelling, 2003; Walker et al., 2004). While some view this characteristic as 
an actual measure of vulnerability--in other words the more resilient, the less vulnerable-- 
(Holling, 2001), others have begun to examine resilience as a component of change in adaptation, 
especially with regard to disasters. The United Nations defines resilience in the context of natural 
disasters as “the capacity of a system, community, or society to resist or to change in order that it 
may obtain an acceptable level in functioning and structure” (UN/ISDR, 2001). Disaster research 
has further defined resilience to better explain local actions to reduce impacts of a disaster, 
especially by outlining actions taken by groups or organizations to overcome loss. Considering 
the concept of resilience has been central to understanding large- and small-scale adaptation, it is 
not surprising that the term has made its way into the language of disaster recovery both in 
government communications and in citizen-led initiatives after disasters (Manyena, 2006). 
However, some have noted that defining resilience as simply returning to a normal function after 
a disturbance can be problematic and, more specifically, this definition does not “measure all of 
the ways in which a system may fail” (Walker et al, 2004, pg. 1). Other processes of adaptation, 
such as transformability, may be better positioned to unpack the root causes of exposure and help 
to develop plans for long-term adaptation.  
Conceptualizing resilience as resisting change, as does the UN definition, runs contrary to 
the view of climate adaptation as an opportunity for a major shift in social and ecological systems. 
Some scholars suggest that “transformability” best describes the type of change that is 
fundamental, and some suggest that transformation at a small scale can enable resilience at larger 
scales (Folke et al., 2010). Resilience and transformation often diverge when considering 
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interactions between social-ecological systems and climate adaptation. This is because resilience 
is not typically characterized as forward-looking (Redman, 2014), while transformation is. In 
addition, transformation involves issues of ethics and process, and opening new possibilities for 
adaptation (Pelling et al., 2015). Despite these differences, both resilience and transformation 
involve learning and adapting as important processes of change. However, the forward-looking 
nature of transformative change allows for consideration of fundamental vulnerabilities and how 
these might affect long-term adaptation or increase exposure to harm or risk (Wisner et al., 2004). 
Adaptation research has recently called for more analysis of transformational change in climate 
adaptation through the lens of social contracts (O’Brien et al., 2009; Adger et al., 2013). Social 
contracts can shed light on the arrangements in place for securing the rights of citizens, and can be 
especially helpful in understanding how governments will secure these rights given the 
uncertainties of climate change. This framing allows transformational change in adaptation to be 
thought of not just as a general shift in systems, but a more complex process of re-negotiating 
rights and responsibilities among different actors.  
 
 
 
2.2 Disasters: opportunities for negotiation and transformation  
While much disaster research has focused on resilience, others have highlighted a 
transformational approach to recovery. Unlike resilience, which is known to be a conservative 
example of adaptation in that it focuses on returning to normalcy, transformational change 
involves examining vulnerabilities so deep that they are almost imperceptible, especially during 
normal times (Pelling, 2011). Since these vulnerabilities are ingrained across social, economic 
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and political domains, challenging them requires also intentionally challenging the status quo 
regarding decision-making across all areas of the social structure. This purposeful type of 
adaptation should also be reflected in the processes of participation and decision-making if 
adaptation is to be considered just and transformational (Schlosberg et al., 2017). In other words, 
the end-goal of transformational change is as important as the deliberation and decision-making 
processes occurring along the way. This understanding of transformation as a purposeful 
examination of the status quo has led to more questions about how societies interpret change and 
adaptation. O’Brien and Selboe (2015) call for a “deeper interpretation of adaptation, recognizing 
that individual and shared beliefs, values, worldviews, and knowledge systems influence how 
people or institutions approach change itself” (p. 312). These values are often the baseline of how 
individuals understand their own capacity for adaptation and can affect actions taken. 
Recent research has pointed to disasters as potential ‘windows of opportunity’ for this 
purposeful fundamental change (Manyena, 2013). Some of the factors that contribute to the idea 
of disasters as opportunities for change are that they bring to light political attention and 
intervention that may not have existed before (Lakoff, 2010), and that the instability brought on 
by the disaster event opens an opportunity for citizen rights to be renegotiated (Pelling & Dill, 
2010). To further consider transformational change after disaster as a negotiation of rights, 
responsibilities, and collectively held values, it is important to identify who is involved in this 
negotiation, as well as their level of involvement. For example, research in ‘transformative 
disaster risk management’ has found that not only do transformations typically happen at a local 
level, but also the ‘burden of transformation’ is also placed on ‘individuals, populations, and civil 
society’ (Gibson et al., 2016, p. 1). In other words, negotiating a new contract for climate 
adaptation can be viewed as a discussion between multiple actors all contributing to change from 
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diverse perspectives and capacities. In this process, what is being negotiated is equally as 
important as who has access to negotiation and what their interests are. Those involved in 
negotiation of a new contract can advocate for their own best interest and work to achieve 
stability, but those who are not participating in the negotiation are not able to do so.  Climate 
change, specifically, presents a challenge in identifying and examining who should participate in 
negotiating change for adaptation because of its effects on voiceless and vulnerable populations 
like those in developing countries, future generations and even non-humans (O’Brien et al., 2009; 
O’Donnell & Talbot-Jones, 2018). Research on how adaptation is negotiated, however, has 
focused mostly on national and international agreements that dictate the rights of citizens and the 
responsibilities of governments in facing climate uncertainty. Nonetheless, climate adaptation 
offers an opportunity to rethink the existing ‘social contract’ in order to establish rights and 
obligations given uncertain futures (Adger et al, 2012). Some scholars have pointed out that new 
agreements around climate adaptation must be more than just old agreements with a new 
environmental component. Instead, it is suggested that an entire new “environmental contract” is 
needed in order to face “threats such as climate change that require collaboration between 
individuals, businesses and governments” (Miliband, 2006). Further unpacking the roles of 
individuals as well as the government in negotiating this new contract means factoring in not only 
rights and responsibilities, but also the core perspectives held around what actually constitutes 
adaptation and long-term recovery. 
Disaster and adaptation research have effectively outlined the complexity of actors, 
dominant beliefs, and processes that constitute change after a disaster event. In describing the 
diverse actions taken to achieve stability in the face of increased risk brought on by climate 
change, there is not one but multiple perspectives of recovery, resilience, adaptation, and 
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transformation that exist in a given context. The value of eliciting diverse perspectives comes 
from an intentional examination of the beliefs associated with immediate recovery and long-term 
adaptation. In the next section, the concepts used to elicit these diverse perspectives are outlined 
as well as key research questions that will guide the process of elicitation and contribute to 
ongoing discussions on the negotiation of recovery and adaptation after disasters.  
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CHAPTER 3 
FRAMING CONCEPTS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Evaluating multiple perspectives is central in framing disaster recovery as a process of 
negotiation. Adger et al. (2003) found that “adaptation will inevitably be characterized both by 
processes of negotiated adjustments involving individuals, civil society, and state, and by 
renegotiation of risk-bearing and sharing between them” (pg. 14).   This research illustrates how 
to elicit different perspectives of disaster recovery and how joining them under a common lens 
generates a conversation that is beneficial for recovery, adaptation, and resilience. When 
considering the multitude of actors involved in recovery, it is useful to recognize that not all of 
these perspectives are “equal” in that they illustrate both institutional and landscape perspectives 
as well as individual and local perspectives. Each of these might hold conflicting views of what 
constitutes adaptation, and actions taken based on those views might have negative consequences 
for some while benefiting others (Kates, 2000). Therefore, this research uses both community and 
government perspectives of stability, vulnerability, and adaptive capacity to explore which 
aspects of disaster recovery and adaptation are being negotiated across these two actors.  
The concept of resilience has been used in framing disaster recovery, and involves evaluating 
vulnerabilities and capacities (Wisner, 2004). However, this evaluation process varies across 
scales, and is often reflective of specific knowledge systems (Vogel et al., 2007). In other words, 
“resilient” outcomes at one scale--within a local community in Puerto Rico, for example-- might 
not reflect the goals that the government has for a “resilient” island as a whole. Further, resilience 
is not the only framing that can be used to understand adaptation to disasters. As discussed before, 
transformation can also help us understand a more intentional approach to adaptation that 
involves challenging not only values and beliefs, but also institutional processes and power 
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dynamics of adaptation. While resilience can be useful in observing how populations “bounce 
back” after a disaster, the concept of transformation is also used here as a means of exploring 
long-term fundamental change and adaptation.  
As previously mentioned, exploring the multiple framings of adaptation held by all of those 
who might influence change will allow for a deeper understanding of the root causes of risk and 
vulnerability affecting adaptation as well as which values are driving adaptation actions. O’Brien 
et al. (2010) write that framing matters because “dominant perspectives do not confront 
fundamental aspects of the problem and may lead to regretful (and deadly) actions or inaction” (p. 
4). Exploring these perspectives will help to address the following research questions: 
• What can be learned from exploring both community-based and official perspectives of 
adaptation to disasters? 
• How are perspectives of adaptation (including stability, vulnerabilities and capacities, and 
fundamental change) articulated across both community interviews and official 
documents?  
• What can these perspectives tell us about the ongoing negotiation of recovery and 
adaptation in Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria?  
By addressing these questions, this research aims to present an initial discussion of recovery 
and adaptation in Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria. While Maria is not the first disaster to be 
considered for its lessons on disaster recovery and adaptation, it adds to our understanding of 
these by exploring a context where power and decision-making are complex given the island’s 
historical context and relationship with the United States (Rodriguez-Diaz, 2018). It also adds to 
current discussions about how to integrate diverse knowledge systems into planning for future 
threats in Puerto Rico by juxtaposing the perspective of government entities, those primarily 
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responsible for recovery, with that of a local community (Ramsey et al., 2019). After Hurricane 
Maria, long-term recovery has been considered mostly by examining the roles of the governments 
of Puerto Rico and the United States (U.S. Congress, 2017). A third perspective is included in this 
research and represents that of a rural community in western Puerto Rico. Community case 
studies have previously been the focus of both academic and policy efforts to understand 
resilience and disaster recovery (Aldrich, 2012). Here, the Corcovada community in Añasco was 
chosen as a case study because of their success in leveraging capacities to negotiate adaptation, 
such as restoring water services to hundreds of people just two days after Hurricane Maria, 
despite existing challenges that predated the storm (FCPR, 2018). While not all communities 
represent cases of quick recovery, these perspectives can offer insights into long-term stability 
and adaptation. Further, analyzing both community and government perspectives can be a first 
step in identifying values and motivations for adaptation among those guiding recovery as well as 
citizens. The following sections introduce the case of Puerto Rico as a unique example of climate 
adaptation, given social, political, and ecological challenges. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE CASE OF HURRICANE MARIA IN PUERTO RICO 
 Puerto Rico is an archipelago in the Caribbean 1,030 miles from the coast of Florida. It is 
an unincorporated territory of the United States which holds commonwealth status1. As a territory 
of the United States since the Treaty of Paris in 1898, residents of Puerto Rico were granted U.S. 
citizenship as a part of the Jones Act in 19172 with unique and discretionary policy structures and 
agreements set up for the island’s economic and social development. Although Puerto Ricans 
have been able to elect their own Governor since 1947, all legislative affairs on the island are 
subject to federal rule, a key component in the structuring of economic and political institutions 
on the island.  The decades following the incorporation of Puerto Rico into the United States was 
marked by the creation of massive institutions on the island and the injection of investment into 
industries such as manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, and energy (COR3, 
2018). PREPA, the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority is one of these institutions and was 
created in 1941 with a mandate of total electrification of the island (Energy Commission of Puerto 
Rico). Since then, PREPA has created, operated, and managed most energy production and 
consumption on the island. This grid that connected regional production to mass distribution and 
transmission has not seen much improvement in infrastructure since it’s construction, which 
contributed to its complete devastation across the island after Hurricane Maria (Vives, 2017). Not 
only was the power grid’s infrastructure brought to its knees after the storm, institutional 
mismanagement of PREPA came into question when considering reconstruction (U.S. Congress, 
2018). As a government institution, PREPA is subject to oversight by the United States 
                                               
1 According to a 1997 GAO report, an unincorporated territory is an area controlled by the United States, but where 
“fundamental rights apply as a matter of law, but other constitutional rights are not available” (GAO, 1997) 
2 This legislation had several components, of which some are related to importing goods to Puerto Rico. 
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government and was highly criticized by members of Congress when considering how the grid 
would be re-imagined after the storm. As the government of Puerto Rico coordinated response 
and recovery with federal entities, questions were brought not only about the island’s failing 
critical infrastructure but also about how reconstruction would be affected by the ongoing 
bankruptcy process that jeopardized the survival of public entities, PREPA included (Garcia-
Lopez, 2018). While the process of reconstructing the energy, grid continues to be deliberated 
among both state and federal actors, other aspects of recovery as well as the role of the United 
States in that process have also been scrutinized.  
 Quickly after Hurricane Maria made landfall in Puerto Rico, discourse surrounding the 
event in mass media presented diverse perspectives of disaster recovery. Headlines about the 
condition of the electric grid, about the state and national government response, the President’s 
response, and the island’s looming fiscal crisis filled newsfeeds (Vick, 2017; DePillis, 2017; 
Campo-Flores, 2018). Maria, the strongest hurricane to make landfall in Puerto Rico since 1928, 
struck the island in September 2017 with sustained winds of 155 miles per hour. Residents of the 
island experienced what is now recognized as the largest blackout in United States history, and 
the second in world history with over 75% of electricity clients without power even after one 
month of the storm’s passing (Houser & Marsters, 2018). Along with damage to nearly all of the 
transmission and distribution lines, Hurricane Maria brought to the forefront questions about 
energy infrastructure on the island and the capacity of PREPA and other government entities to 
address emergencies involving both critical infrastructure and essential services. In emergency 
response phases, recovery was almost exclusively dictated by the state government of Puerto Rico 
and federal entities like FEMA and the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). Much 
like any other State, Puerto Rico received help from FEMA as well as personnel from other states 
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through an Emergency Management Assistance Compact. However, unlike responses to 
hurricanes in other regions of the U.S., FEMA was not able to quickly deploy resources and help 
to Puerto Rico after Maria due to its geographic location, effectively exacerbating damages and 
delaying aid (Willison et al., 2019). 
 The damage to the built infrastructure was felt across the entire island, since foundational 
systems like the electric grid were vulnerable and therefore took down other integrated systems 
such as communication and medical services (COR3, 2018). Failures in these essential services 
were not something that could be addressed quickly by either federal or local responders because 
of the island’s isolated geography. In addition, landslides, overflowing rivers, and obstructed 
roads prohibited access to vulnerable communities once emergency personnel were able to reach 
the island. Finally, recovery aid and essential resources arriving from surrounding countries and 
territories was not able to be sent to Puerto Rico due to maritime laws that require all shipments 
arriving to ports be on U.S. vessels. This lagging recovery process was seen at just about every 
phase and was at the forefront of news coverage. This process was not uniform across the 
different regions of Puerto Rico and while some areas received resources and restored essential 
services like electricity and water relatively quickly, others still lacked these even after one year 
(AP, 2018). As emergency relief was being coordinated across state and federal departments, the 
island’s infrastructure collapsed resulting in the death of at least 2,975 U.S. citizens (George 
Washington University, 2018). The island’s residents organized to minimize damages and loss of 
life despite inconsistent aid from federal, state, and local resources. While challenges associated 
with location and the arrival of emergency aid proved to be detrimental across the island, there 
were some communities that overcame these vulnerabilities. One of these is the focus of this 
research, a community in the western mountainous region of Puerto Rico. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 This research aims to answer the previous questions by exploring narratives of recovery and 
stability in Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria. Adaptation research has cemented the importance 
of examining the processes, relevant discourses, and those involved in planning for climate 
change (O’Brien & Selboe, 2015). Typically, government discourse has been recognized as 
having the most impact on policy making, especially for climate change. Community discourse 
has also been explored by some scholars as a way to understand local vulnerabilities and 
capacities for climate adaptation (Schlosberg et al., 2017). Lastly, not considering the value of 
both of these perspectives  could lead to exclusion of those with less power, as well as 
exacerbated climate risks (Barnett & Palutikoff, 2015). Therefore, to effectively examine disaster 
recovery as a process of negotiation and adaptation, both the perspective of the government of 
Puerto Rico will be considered, as well as perspectives from the Corcovada community in 
Añasco.  
 Access to the Corcovada community allowed for this study to be designed around a local case 
of recovery after Hurricane Maria. Therefore, participation in this study was not random, but 
purposefully chosen to include the Corcovada community’s story as well as the perspective of 
recovery and adaptation as told by two central government documents. Given the history of the 
community in its organization around their community aqueduct and their ability to restore water 
to those in the area after such devastation helps to answer the question of how recovery actions 
are negotiated and executed despite some notable vulnerabilities associated with living in 
Corcovada.  On the other hand, government documents provide a distinct perspective that focuses 
on coordinating recovery and negotiating adaptation at the island level. Both of these sources give 
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insight into vulnerabilities and capacities at a community level as well as the government’s 
perspective on recovery, both perspectives that are recognized as crucial in exploring new 
arrangements for climate adaptation (Pelling & Dill, 2010). The following sections describe these 
sources and why they were chosen for this research. 
 
5.1 Community interviews and recovery documents 
 While resilience was a word used across reports and releases by federal entities and news 
media outlets to describe recovery (Donalds, 2018; Ortega, 2018; FEMA 2017, 2018; FCC, 2018; 
DOE, 2017; Rockefeller Foundation, 2018), these sources didn’t necessarily offer one cohesive 
perspective. The government of Puerto Rico ultimately surpasses any other entity as being central 
to recovery both directly and through collaboration with the U.S. government and other non-
government entities. Specifically, COR3, the agency created after Hurricane Maria tasked with 
coordinating resilient recovery, housed documents on emergency management by FEMA as well 
other reports from the Governor’s office and COR3 itself. At the time, there were two major 
documents that stood out because they documented the critical first steps towards recovery and an 
outline for long-term transitions. First of these is “Build Back Better Puerto Rico”, the official 
request for federal assistance where the Puerto Rican government explains the damage caused by 
Hurricane Maria across the island and the resources necessary to survive the first steps of 
emergency management. The second is “Transformation and Innovation in the Wake of 
Devastation”, which despite being generally aimed at outlining an economic recovery plan for the 
island provides the government’s most comprehensive assessment of recovery to date. A primary 
motivation for reviewing official recovery documents was to learn more about how the 
government has come to understand recovery after Hurricane Maria, and what motivations are 
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guiding the process of adaptation across the island. Since the government of Puerto Rico will be a 
central figure in dictating new arrangements for adapting to Maria and future threats, their 
perspective will be key in conceptualizing resilience in recovery.  
 The second set of data consists of semi-structured community interviews. Since the aim of this 
research was not to present established frameworks of recovery to participants, or evaluate and 
promote a particular perspective of adaptation, a mostly qualitative methodology was appropriate. 
Denzin and Lincoln (2011) write, “Interviews record what the interviewer draws out, what the 
interviewer remembers, what he or she chooses to tell, and how he or she understands what 
happened” (pg. 452). The goal of using this method was to capture what this community 
understands their own recovery and long-term stability to be. Corcovada residents have a unique 
perspective to offer since their recovery was notably different than that of other communities 
across the island. For this reason, community interviews were focused on questions about 
recovery after Hurricane Maria but also expanded to include what individuals perceive daily 
stability in Corcovada to be and how they restored that stability after the storm. Therefore, much 
like the government recovery documents, the interviews were able to not only present a timeline 
of facts about post-Maria recovery, but the deeply held values that are associated with adaptation 
actions both in Corcovada and across Puerto Rico.   
 The goal of joining perspectives of recovery across these two groups is to generate an 
understanding of how stability will be achieved on the island after Hurricane Maria and, more 
generally, in the face of climate uncertainty. Neither one of these two perspectives of recovery are 
meant to be taken as the correct conceptualization of stability or successful adaptation. Rather, 
they are explored here to show that any action towards both short-term recovery and long-term 
stability must be considered within a unique context. In other words, the government of Puerto 
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Rico’s coordination of post-disaster recovery reflects a larger context influenced by a particular 
sociopolitical, economic and ecological landscape. Community interviews also give context to the 
government’s account of recovery, since the perception of individual citizens allows a deeper 
understanding of barriers to implementing institutional adaptation actions and root causes of 
vulnerability (Azhoni & Goyal, 2018). Finally, bringing both perspectives together provides not 
just a description of recovery, but a reflection of power, capacity, vulnerabilities and challenges 
across scales. Considering both accounts of recovery could reveal disjunctions on what constitutes 
stability on the island, therefore influencing actions towards adaptation or even prohibiting 
adaptation.  
 
5.2 “What do you mean by resilience?”: interview questions and other challenges 
 Translating concepts which in themselves are varied and contested into guiding interview 
questions comes with inherent challenges. For this study, one challenge came in documenting 
perspectives and conceptualizations of resilience while recognizing that participants will not 
likely use this word, or any concept found in the literature, to help guide observations. Instead, 
interviews depended on questions about capacity and resources in the community, the experience 
of the hurricane, and recovery efforts both local and across the island. [A full interview protocol 
is shown in Appendix C].  
 Since Corcovada has previously been the subject of case studies, community leaders took 
much of the direction in recruiting participants who would be willing to be interviewed. During 
visits to the community, leaders would act as guides throughout the neighborhood, recommending 
households to interview. This sampling strategy represents another challenge in getting a wide 
range of perspectives within the community, since participation would be mostly out of my 
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control. However, this saved time in recruitment and proved to be helpful in navigating around 
the community and surrounding areas3. 
 
5.3 Analyzing interviews and documents 
 The mostly open and unstructured interview process used in this study was conducive to a 
similar “open” form of data analysis that consisted of open coding using key concepts to identify 
common themes from the interviews and documents. No demographic or other statistical analysis 
was conducted, since the Corcovada community was chosen purposefully for their history of 
community organization and the sample of participants themselves were nearly all older residents 
of the community who lived along the main road. Qualitative interviews produced narrative-like 
data, and not easily identifiable or closed answers. Therefore, line-by-line coding was used to 
produce a list of codes which were then grouped into larger themes4. A similar open coding was 
used for the recovery documents, and new themes found in the documents were added to the list 
from the interviews.  Making a list of themes across both documents and interviews allowed a 
better understanding of key research concepts-- stability, vulnerabilities, capacities, 
transformation--and how they appear in both sets of data. The next sections present key findings 
from official documents and community interviews discuss these themes within the context of the 
research questions. 
                                               
3 A map of the location of the Corcovada community is in Appendix B 
4 A full list of codes is in Appendix D 
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CHAPTER 6 
FINDINGS 
Narratives from interviews centered around the community members’ conceptualization of 
bouncing back after the hurricane by organizing community-led recovery. In addition, community 
members described how they maintain stability in Corovada during normal times, especially 
given the isolated location of the community and the challenges associated with access to basic 
services like water infrastructure as well as lack of access to a hospital emergency room in the 
immediate area. Residents are eliminating their vulnerabilities by strengthening the reliability of 
their community aqueduct, mainly by establishing new solar energy infrastructures.  By 
describing how social organization in the community helped to address damages after the 
hurricane and mentioning which community values are carried into actions to better Corcovada, 
interviews showed how residents perceive their capacity and motivations for adaptation after 
Hurricane Maria.  
Across government documents, the vulnerabilities that exacerbated destruction on the 
island after Hurricane Maria are mostly associated with the failing energy grid, aging critical 
infrastructure, and the lack of coordinated help due to inconsistent emergency management and a 
challenging geographic location. To counteract these adverse conditions, both the Official 
Request for Federal Funds and the island’s Long-Term Economic Recovery Plan stress the role of 
financial capital in reconstructing the island’s infrastructure. Looking beyond the rebuilding of 
physical infrastructure, the recovery documents frame long-term adaptation as “innovative” and 
“transformative”. Similar to the perspective of recovery as told by the residents of Corcovada, the 
government of Puerto Rico suggests reimagining major systems on the island. However, these 
include political and financial systems, and do not consider changing the vulnerable energy grid. 
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The following sections will further elaborate on the themes of stability, vulnerability, and 
capacities for adaptation that were observed within both interview data as well as in the 
government’s plans for disaster recovery and provide examples from the analyzed text 
throughout.  
 
6.1  “La gente empezaba a luchar para las cosas y de repente las cosas llegaban” [“People 
started to fight for things, and suddenly those things were provided”]: adaptation in 
Corcovada 
 The first residents to be interviewed in the community showed an eagerness to talk about 
work done by Corcovada residents after the hurricane to address damages. However, after 
continuing to speak with more neighbors, the community’s work proved to be a common theme in 
nearly all aspects of community life, not just after Hurricane Maria. After the storm, residents of 
Corcovada came together to address critical infrastructure damage, mainly by restoring electricity 
and clearing roads for emergency personnel to be able to enter the community. During “normal 
times” the community organization is manifested in the form of a committee which coordinates to 
maintain the aqueduct system, organize activities and educational resources for residents. While 
the concerns of the community shifted to focus on the hurricane for some time, their organization 
is a capacity that residents of Corcovada say is a part of their culture. In the following sections, 
this idea will be explored through a description given by the residents themselves. 
Corcovada residents spoke of a future-oriented approach as central to recovery. The goal 
of restoring essential services after Hurricane Maria might be to return the community to a normal 
functioning state, but the actions taken by the Corcovada community involve envisioning and 
transforming their system to where vulnerabilities associated with the failing grid were reduced or 
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even eliminated. One example of this is the community aqueduct, managed by leadership within 
the community who have formed a central committee called the “Comité Comunal de 
Corcovada”. Creating and managing the community aqueduct has been a critical practice in 
organization. Another example of this organization was how residents reimagined their energy 
infrastructure after Maria to consider a photovoltaic system that would make their aqueduct 
independent of PREPA’s energy infrastructure.  
Separating the community’s potable water system from the public water and sewage 
authority, PRASA, happened more than 50 years ago and has proved to be central in reducing 
vulnerabilities associated with water infrastructure. One leader said,  
 
“And that’s where the organization comes in. If we weren’t organized here, we would 
be like the neighborhood just over there, they depended on [PRASA] when the 
hurricane came. You can’t trust [PRASA] so that’s why we have the [aqueduct] 
system” [I3] 
 
Managing a separate water system for the community stems from a mistrust in the public 
sewage authority, whose infrastructure failed after Maria. In COR3’s assessment of Puerto Rico’s 
water system, the government noted that, 
 
“There are great deficiencies in water production, management, and distribution. A 
concise and sustainable plan for dredging and maintaining water reservoirs is needed; 
currently, close to 50 percent of the water produced is lost through leaks in the water 
distribution lines.” [RD1] 
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After Hurricane Maria, this resulted in mass water outages for the island’s residents. In 
November 2017, one month after the storm, the government of Puerto Rico reported that “until 
recently 70% of the potable water is either unavailable or has yet to be certified as safe to drink” 
(Government of P.R., 2017). Meanwhile, Corcovada residents were able to restore water services 
through the use of their community aqueduct. They did this by securing a backup generator to 
connect and power water pumps, which was given to the community after one resident attended a 
FEMA meeting. This very much differentiated Corcovada from surrounding communities that 
remained without running water after the storm. One resident looks back on the impact that 
having a community aqueduct has had: 
 
“[Over the past] 50 years, the community has always had water and has had everything 
at home. Then you go to other places and you see the all need that there is..”[I1] 
 
Unlike water, residents still lacked electricity for months after the hurricane. Most 
participants mentioned electricity as a cascading damage brought on by the Hurricane, since 
power outages affect almost everything in the community including the aqueduct’s water pumps 
and support systems for residents with medical conditions. Some comments on the effects of not 
having electricity were: 
 
“The highest concern is that we didn’t have electricity…the electricity came 
back…when did it come back? It came back in February. 127 days without electricity” 
[I3] 
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“They have a little boy who has some dystrophy...they have him hooked up to a bunch 
of machines and a respirator, goodness you wouldn’t believe it. Then they’re over there 
in that isolated house.” [I6] 
 
Geographic location was also a challenge that affected the community’s ability to restore 
energy, since the Corcovada area is in a mountain region with only one road leading to and from 
the center of town. Despite damages related to lack of electricity, the community organized to 
brainstorm about moving their aqueduct to a separate power system to eliminate the 
vulnerabilities associated with being connected to the public energy authority, PREPA. By 
tapping into resources from a solar energy company and foundation, they planned to have panels 
and batteries installed to the aqueduct system to prevent any water disruptions. Some community 
leaders said,  
  
“Well now we’re thinking about a solar energy system for the families here. And that 
way, if the cement post falls, well we wouldn’t have to bring in another one because 
the energy would be solar.” [I5] 
 
“We got a quote from a [solar company and foundation] and they said it would be forty-
five thousand, but the foundation would cover 60% or something like that. So, then all 
we had to do was find 18 thousand or so.” [I2] 
 
“If we could put solar [panel] units on our houses and for our aqueduct system, we 
wouldn’t have to worry.” [I5] 
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The energy grid was by far the most cited damage associated with the Hurricane. In 
addressing damage to their energy supply, community members seized an opportunity to 
implement a photovoltaic system that would further separate them from the aging electrical 
infrastructure. This future-oriented approach is largely made possible by the use of social capital 
through a community work ethic and mobilizing external resources. This self-organization was 
key in hurricane recovery but has roots in the Corcovada community culture. 
 
6.2 Self organization and social capital 
One central tool allowing the Corcovada community to harness external resources, 
coordinate relief efforts, and maintain community stability is a self-organization they have 
developed over many decades. This organization was key in coping with geographic and financial 
vulnerabilities after the hurricane. During interviews, residents identified church groups, NGO’s, 
foundations, and friends from the mainland U.S. as sources of support after the hurricane. All 
these entities contributed in one way, or multiple, in the community’s organization in recovery 
efforts. As a foundational resource, support from neighbors within the community and extended 
family members were also mentioned as key in cleanup efforts, finding a backup generator, and 
even food delivery after the hurricane. The only road that goes up to and through the community 
was damaged and covered in debris after Hurricane Maria. Residents recalled the days after the 
storm when community members took to the streets to handle cleanup. After clearing pathways of 
debris, residents were able to make their way down the road to get the aqueduct up and running. 
Some residents described the days after Maria: 
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“Here, there were 45 people out on the roads cleaning debris so that the posts could be 
put back up, picking up electric cables, clearing the way.” [I4] 
 
“People took to the streets. They cut trees and cleaned up. We had this place looking 
like new after two days.” [I6] 
 
Help from neighbors was present after the storm, but also when participants spoke about 
daily life in Corcovada. Within the community, the internal culture of reciprocity towards fellow 
residents was present after the hurricane as seen in road cleanup, but also during normal times. 
One participant said, 
 
“If I have to move a tree at my house, it’s not just me doing it. Five more people show 
up. It’s mutual help, and that’s important to have.” [I10] 
 
Another participant mentioned that despite the geographic landscape of the area, 
community members feel connected to one another. They say,  
 
“If you look at our community, even though we each have our own land and our own 
houses, we’re more united than those neighborhoods where all the houses are lined up” 
[I13]” 
 
Corcovada has historical ties to the church community, particularly Christian 
organizations which were among the first to arrive in the mountain area of Añasco to build the 
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first schools and communities where Corcovada is now. This connection was felt strongly through 
all the interviews with residents. “God has blessed us and look at all that we have”, said one 
resident [I3]. Although church groups were among the most cited resources for help post-
hurricane, residents also mentioned a network including non-profits and extended family of 
Corcovada residents. One resident said  
 
“The Presbyterian church helped a lot and some university students came to help too. 
And now I hear they are setting up a solar unit with another group.” [I5] 
 
Another resident said that the community was thankful to have had the help of people 
across the island coming to help friends or family in the community and bringing equipment and 
machinery with them.  
 
“The best we had was that we had two people come with machinery whose [family] 
was from Corcovada. When the hurricane came, one of them came down from over 
there and the other from Ponce and cleaned all up and down. They used the machines 
and with them and people helping, everything looked clean in no time.” [I2] 
 
Similar external resources were activated when the community’s backup generator for the 
aqueduct system stopped working. One community leader was invited to a FEMA visit meeting in 
the city center of Añasco and recalled, 
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“When I arrived at the meeting, there was someone I knew there. I told him our 
generator stopped working and he said, ‘FEMA has one that you can use’.” [I11] 
 
Based on insight from participants, networks within the community helped problems like 
road cleanup after Hurricane Maria, despite neighbors being quite far from each other 
geographically. External networks including church groups, extended family members of 
residents, and friends positioned within FEMA helped bring food, supplies and most importantly 
a diesel generator that the community used to power their aqueduct. While Corcovada residents 
self-organized to recover from the Hurricane and better their community, official documents 
provided a perspective of recovery that included evaluating institutional, social, and economic 
vulnerabilities while navigating stability across the island.  
 
6.3 Vulnerabilities: energy grid, emergency management, and fiscal crisis 
After Hurricane Maria, emergency personnel and recovery officials were tasked with both 
assessing the acute damage of the hurricane as well as considering efforts for long-term recovery. 
The first document chosen for this analysis, titled” Build Back Better Puerto Rico”, was focused 
on outlining damages reported by FEMA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, then made 
requests for federal funding to address those.  In describing the impacts of the hurricane, the 
documents outlined threats produced by the storm as well as vulnerabilities that predated the 
hurricane. The second document analyzed, titled “Transformation and Innovation in the Wake of 
Devastation” moves beyond assessing damage to include plans for long-time recovery. The 
document highlights the values guiding Puerto Rico’s transition out of emergency management 
into planning for the island’s future. Among the island’s biggest challenges for adaptation cited in 
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the official documents was the weak energy infrastructure which took down other critical systems 
like water and communications, obstacles in planning and executing emergency response, and 
insecurity stemming from the existing fiscal crisis. Initial assessments of the damage to energy 
infrastructure done by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) reported,  
 
“The transmission and distribution system consists of 2,478 miles of transmission 
lines, 31,485 miles of distribution lines, and 344 substations. The storms decimated 
both transmission and distribution lines across the island, with 847 poles and 
transmission towers destroyed, and nearly 900 conductor and insulator failures 
system-wide. 74% of substations, both primary and secondary control centers and all 
power generation plants incurred moderate to severe flooding and varying levels of 
wind damage.”[RD1] 
 
Damage to the grid had a cascading effect, since water, communications, and health 
services were also paralyzed due to lack of electricity. One document describes the compiling 
damage due to loss of energy: 
 
“..many hospitals and primary care facilities were forced to close, nursing homes were 
left without power or resources, the social service “safety net” fell apart, and basic 
resources such as clean and potable water, food and medicine became scarce and 
turned the emergency on the island into a humanitarian crisis.” [RD1]   
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Re-imagining the grid may not have been as pressing of an issue as was major cleanup of 
debris—mainly electric poles and transmission lines -- and distributing generators for temporary 
use. These tasks were made even more challenging because of Puerto Rico’s geographic location 
and the restriction of foreign aid. Recovery dragged on for long periods due to the distance 
between Puerto Rico and the closest state that could provide assistance. Looking back on the days 
after Hurricane Maria, one report said, 
 
“…aid from other states was not readily available due to a lack of mutual assistance 
compacts and the geographical separation of more than 1,000 miles between Puerto 
Rico and the continental United States.” [RD1] 
 
While the acute damage to the grid was most visible post-hurricane, the recovery process 
was severely setback by delays in the delivery of aid. Although an Emergency Management 
Assistance Compact (EMAC) allowed other states to send aid, the journey to Puerto Rico was still 
far, and paralyzed airports and seaports stalled aid from getting to the places it was needed the 
most. Aid from other states arrived often too late and help from surrounding countries was 
prohibited by existing maritime laws. One document noted that this policy “requires that all goods 
transported by water between U.S. ports be carried on U.S.-flag ships that are constructed in the 
United States, owned by U.S. citizens, and crewed by U.S. citizens and U.S. permanent residents” 
[RD2]. Even though this law was waived for ten days on September 28, 2017, COR3’s long-term 
recovery plan notes the effects that this law has on the island not just during a disaster, but in 
normal times. It states, 
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“The Jones Act may constrain Puerto Rico’s ability to import a variety of goods and 
services at more-competitive prices (including, but not limited to, liquefied natural gas, 
food, and other commodities). Although data limitations obscure the exact magnitude 
of the effect, it is likely that the prices of imports in Puerto Rico, and of the goods and 
services produced from these imports, may be artificially inflated, which disadvantages 
both producers and consumers.” [RD2] 
 
Another vulnerability mentioned in the long-term recovery plan was the effect that the 
island’s existing debt crisis would play in securing funds for recovery. Specifically, the Puerto 
Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) is mentioned, as is the 
Fiscal Oversight and Management Board which monitors all government spending on the island. 
The crisis was described the following way: 
 
“Economic contraction in the years prior to the hurricanes contributed to a severe fiscal 
crisis, in which lower revenues and high rates of spending were financed through heavy 
borrowing. This resulted in high and unsustainable levels of debt, including more than 
$70 billion in bond debt and a substantial unfunded pension liability. Despite 
stabilization efforts by the government of Puerto Rico, Puerto Rico’s credit rating 
dropped below investment grade in early 2014, followed by a series of defaults on debt 
payments. The fiscal crisis ultimately resulted in the passage of the Puerto Rico 
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) in 2016, which 
established the Financial Oversight and Management Board (FOMB) and provided the 
framework for restructuring Puerto Rico’s debt. FOMB’s purpose is “to provide a 
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method for [Puerto Rico] to achieve fiscal responsibility and access to the capital 
markets” by certifying financial plans, approving and monitoring budgets and activities 
related to the budgets and fiscal plans, providing advice on issues of financial stability 
and management, and certifying restructuring and approving actions related to debt 
issuance. Recovery activities will be undertaken in a way that is consistent with 
FOMB’s authorities.” 
 
Further, official documents mention economic stability as an integral part of recovery. Along with 
new infrastructure, new economic strategies are key in the government plans  
for recovery. One document says,  
 
“we can implement innovative solutions that can make Puerto Rico a showcase for the 
world with a modern and more resilient infrastructure, a newer and stronger housing 
stock, and a more vibrant and competitive economy” [RD2] 
 
In recognizing PROMESA and its effect on the island’s economic capacity in the face of Maria, 
official documents say that the disaster also presents an opportunity to build on this law in a way 
that benefits Puerto Rico. The language in the document reads, 
 
“The plan presents an opportunity to build on the policies of fiscal stabilization and 
debt restructuring laid out in the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic 
Stability Act and to invest in a way that revitalizes our island and people as an asset for 
America’s national and global economic success.” 
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Major vulnerabilities outlined in recovery documents--the energy grid, lack of 
comprehensive and effective emergency management, and the island’s fiscal crisis--are cited as 
root causes of risk associated with Hurricane Maria. Government documents recognize that 
overcoming these obstacles in the short term represents a challenge for recovery, and also point to 
pathways for transforming these vulnerable systems for long-term stability. 
 
6.4 Transformation through investment, innovation, and statehood 
 
In recovery documents, Hurricane Maria is suggested to be a window of opportunity to 
reimagine the island’s physical and economic systems. The long-term economic recovery plan 
says, 
 
“The complete and widespread devastation gives us an opportunity to view our island 
as a blank canvas, upon which we can implement innovative solutions that can make 
Puerto Rico a showcase for the world with a modern and more resilient infrastructure, 
a newer and stronger housing stock, and a more vibrant and competitive economy” 
[RD2] 
 
Energy infrastructure is prioritized both in immediate reconstruction and some 
government reports prioritize reconstructing the old grid. For example, one comment suggested 
that the grid’s failure presents a 
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“unique opportunity to rebuild the power infrastructure and rethink how power is 
generated and distributed across the island to make the system more efficient, resilient, 
and sustainable.” [RD1] 
 
However, in the island’s requests for federal funds the budget indicates that the majority of funds 
would be spent on  
 
“ ..substation reconstructions and flood protection; transmission and distribution lines 
hardening, control center rebuilding, with upgrades to the operation and IT; power 
generation, and fuel supply hardening”. [RD1] 
 
In its initial assessment of hurricane damages and requests for federal funding to address these, 
one government document frames the destruction as a chance to re-design the island’s economic 
and built infrastructure. The document says, 
 
“Due to the unparalleled and widespread devastation, the disaster recovery period in 
Puerto Rico represents a chance to “begin again” and rethink the design of major 
components of the Island’s critical infrastructure, invest in the quality and 
survivability of its housing stock and public buildings, and restructure, modernize and 
reform how it delivers basic services to its residents. Puerto Rico can also improve its 
resiliency and sustainability to protect the federal and state investment in the recovery 
and produce benefits for the island’s residents for generations to come.” [RD1] 
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Outside of federal aid, the other most cited source of funding were partnerships with 
private-sector entities. Public-private partnerships, or “P3” as the documents call them, form part 
of the aid network outlined by recovery plans. They are mentioned as key in economic investment 
for long-term recovery. In official documents, they are mentioned as both sources of aid for 
recovery and for long-term economic reform: 
 
“It is clear that multiple federal agencies, as well as private insurance proceeds and the 
private sector—including public-private partnerships, charitable foundations, 
corporate foundations, and institutional investors—will play a part in funding the 
recovery” [RD2] 
 
“We will need to pull together both resources and expertise from countless public and 
private-sector partners” [RD2] 
 
Further, the government’s economic recovery plan includes policy reform to make way for such 
investments in public-private partnership on the island.  
 
“While regulations can be effective at promoting and protecting public interests, 
outdated and obsolete regulations may unnecessarily curtail economic growth and 
impede private sector investment” [RD2] 
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Not only do recovery documents signal change in infrastructure and the economy, they 
also mention shifts in political arrangements as a way to secure stability in the long-term. In the 
long-term recovery plan, Governor Roselló writes,  
  
“to be confident both now and in the future that the inequities experienced in our past 
will fade forever, we will need to put Puerto Rico on a path to full equality through 
statehood. From that point forward, we will be fully empowered as citizens of the 
United States, with equal rights and responsibilities, to contribute to the success not 
only of Puerto Rico but of the United States as a while.” [RD2] 
 
The plan for transformation is evident in both documents, which mention changes in housing, 
energy, and the economy will be a part of Puerto Rico’s vision for stability. One document 
summarizes these changes by stating,  
 
“Puerto Rico is ripe for transformative innovation; the Island will not only address 
recovery needs but also address the chronic issues and ongoing concerns that have been 
a drag on Puerto Rico’s ability to prosper. Recovery dollars will be invested with the 
intent to propel Puerto Rico toward the visions and goals set forth in the foundational 
plans. It is essential that capital investments be used in a strategic manner to affect the 
recovery by improving the physical infrastructure beyond its pre-hurricane condition, 
by improving the human capital environment, and by improving the natural capacity of 
the Island.” [RD2] 
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Recovery documents stress the importance of innovation--both physical and political--in 
maintaining stability on the island. Although they describe the island as a “blank canvas” with 
which new economic and social systems can be created, they also recognize that there are major 
barriers, such as the island’s current political arrangement with the United States, which will 
present challenges along the way. “Innovation” is also mentioned as an underlying theme for 
actions taken in long-term recovery, but documents mainly cite economic investment in the 
energy grid and partnerships with non-government entities as innovative solutions to major issues. 
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                                                               CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION 
For Puerto Rico, Hurricane Maria represented a significant shift as the local and federal 
government as well as all of the island’s citizens endured the most fatal disaster to hit the United 
States in recent history. The storm itself posed a great physical threat, however, further 
examination shows that economic and social conditions present on the island before Maria are 
inextricably tied to the hurricane damage and must therefore be considered as part of recovery and 
adaptation post-Maria. Both disaster and adaptation research have each explored the notion of 
recovery as a social-ecological process that involves addressing both physical and non-physical 
vulnerabilities. Further, studies have used concepts such as resilience and adaptive capacity to 
explain how various factors influence adaptation outcomes. The following discussion shows how 
conceptualizations of vulnerability, capacities, and long-term stability are manifested in recovery 
actions of a local community as well as in major plans outlined by the government of Puerto Rico. 
 
7.1 Vulnerability pre-Maria: physical and social instability 
Carpenter (2013) writes, “Geographic space is the stage to which we assign meaning and 
in which social interactions are set” (pg. 13).  Geographic factors did greatly affect both the 
amount of damage caused by Hurricane Maria as well as recovery processes. Prior to Hurricane 
Maria, the island’s location and geography was significant in that it represented the physical and 
political separation between the local government and the oversight of the United States. This 
separation is not only a metaphor for the dual-governing system that exists on the island and that 
has produced instability in managing the island’s economic and infrastructure systems. It also 
represented a physical challenge in that key recovery entities such as FEMA were not able to 
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quickly get to the island to deliver necessary resources and services. Official recovery documents 
point to a mixture of infrastructural and institutional disjointedness that multiplied the destructive 
effects of Hurricane Maria. Not only do the documents outline the failures of the energy grid and 
the cascading effects on medical assistance, communications, and water supply, but they also 
describe the lack of systems in place to coordinate across recovery entities like FEMA. The 
island’s dangerous location was a major challenge in immediate recovery, proving to be a 
contributing factor to damage associated with the storm (Blaikie et al. 1994). This vulnerability 
exacerbated challenges not only for recovery entities, but also made it difficult for communities 
such as Corcovada to receive aid and restore power once FEMA and local officials were able to 
mobilize.  
In addition to physical constraints, political processes can also add to instability and 
vulnerability when confronting climate adaptation (Lecheinko & O’Brien, 2008). In Puerto Rico, 
the lack of access to federal aid was cited by the government as a main setback in recovery 
actions, and statehood is presented as an option for overcoming the political vulnerability that 
stems from the island’s status of ‘unincorporated territory of the United States’. For Corcovada 
residents, there is a recognition that physical and social systems across the island are ineffective 
in providing communities with essential services such as water and energy, which proved to be 
especially true after Hurricane Maria. The community’s internal social structure, their central 
committee, is a testament to their overcoming broader instability across the island to address 
issues faced by residents. 
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7.2 Key adaptation capacities: self-organization and social capital 
A rapid assessment of Corcovada after Hurricane Maria might describe the community as 
“resilient” in that they were able to return to stability quickly after the storm through community 
organization and work. A closer look, however, may point to a more specific type of resilience, 
social resilience, which goes beyond system stability to consider things such as livelihood, 
institutional organization, and stakeholder input (Adger, 2000). Social resilience, often associated 
with community resilience, has not been shown to reduce overall vulnerability of a community on 
its own (Wilson, 2013). Yet, in the case of Corcovada, the social action approach proved to be 
successful in recovery after Hurricane Maria, especially in restoring energy and water services. 
The ability of the community to adapt to stressful conditions after the hurricane by drawing on 
social capital is the most prominent of the capacities demonstrated after the storm and is largely 
due to their ability to overcome lack of internal resources by mobilizing networks of aid.  Actions 
taken by local institutions, such as community groups, and their ability to learn and organize after 
a disaster have been described as organizational resilience (Tierney & Bruneau, 2007). 
Speranza (2014) mentions self-organization as a major attribute of resilience. They make 
the distinction of general self-organization, or spontaneous emergence of a whole new societal 
structure, and autonomous self-organization as a group defining their own rules and processes 
under conditions of crises or instability. Some indicators for self-organization, according to the 
authors, are the presence of “institutions, cooperation and networks, and reliance on own 
resources” (Speranza, 2014). In the face of a crisis and unstable environment such as the period 
after Hurricane Maria, these characteristics of community organization in Corcovada proved to be 
crucial adaptation capacities that contributed to ensuring basic needs were met within the 
community. The community aqueduct is by far the most prominent example of this organization 
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and was key in securing access to running water after the hurricane. Planning around failing water 
infrastructure led to formation of the aqueduct and is an example of reorganization and learning 
for adaptation (Cutter et al., 2008). While disaster research would refer to this organization as 
hazard mitigation since it relates to restoring water after a disaster, this attribute of the Corcovada 
community is also present during normal times and therefore more closely resembles community 
resilience (Goldschalk, 2002; Adger, 2005).  
In Corcovada, community stability is held together by a web of internal and external 
resources. Internally, they demonstrate a responsibility towards one another after the hurricane 
through road cleanup and during normal times through managing the aqueduct. This sense of 
connectedness is associated with bonding social capital and has been linked with overcoming 
vulnerabilities in isolated communities (Adger, 2003). Bonding social capital is a characteristic of 
communities with high social cohesion (Adger, 2003). Other forms of social capital were shown 
in the community’s ability to find resources outside of their internal network. This bridging social 
capital was the reason for securing a diesel generator after attending a visit from FEMA officials. 
The community also received help from church groups who brought food after the storm and 
friends and family of community members who came to help clear roads with machinery. Going 
beyond immediate recovery, the community received funding from an environmental foundation 
to install a photovoltaic system to connect to their aqueduct. For residents of Corcovada, the high 
value placed on connections both in and outside of the community represents their perceived 
stability before and after Hurricane Maria. While emergency assistance from recovery entities and 
financial assistance to bolster their water and energy infrastructure played an important role, these 
were discussed as peripheral to the social structure that exists in the community. Meanwhile, 
official recovery documents illustrated institutional arrangements and financial resources as 
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central to stability in Puerto Rico not just after Maria, but as a baseline for solving other issues 
identified by the government. 
 
7.3 Transformative adaptation 
Forward-thinking in Corcovada is an approach that is used for reducing their overall 
vulnerability as an isolated community. Adger (2000) defines adaptive capacity as the ability to 
cope with external stressors, yet actions taken by the Corcovada community reflect something 
beyond coping. Their ability to reduce vulnerabilities associated with the failing energy grid and 
further strengthen their water infrastructure represents planning for long-term stability. This 
forward-thinking approach is not commonly used in conceptualizations of resilience, especially 
when there is a focus on system stability or equilibrium (Redman, 2014). Sustainability research, 
on the other hand, emphasizes adaptability and change, especially when planning for the future. In 
Corcovada, the actions taken to connect their community aqueduct to solar panels in case of more 
grid failures is an example of this future oriented action and could potentially reduce vulnerability 
in the community even more. This future-oriented approach is a characteristic of transformative 
adaptation, which the Corcovada residents have adopted to reduce their vulnerability even prior to 
Hurricane Maria. This transformational approach is manifested in their challenging of 
institutional arrangements such as the disaster recovery process conducted by local and federal 
entities. By using internal networks, they were able to circumvent the ineffective recovery actions 
by the government of Puerto Rico and FEMA to create their own system of aid.  
For the Corcovada community, the ‘window of opportunity’ which triggered fundamental 
system change did not happen after Hurricane Maria, but decades before (Manyena, 2013). For 
the government of Puerto Rico, however, the notion of transformative change is just starting to 
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take root and is present in major recovery and economic plans. The approach taken by Corcovada 
is more in line with common conceptualizations of transformation, since it represents a more 
intentional way of re-imagining systems to benefit community members. The presence of a 
central committee also reflects an integration of diverse perspectives and robust decision-making 
that is associated with transformative change (Schlosberg et al 2017). The approach taken by the 
government of Puerto Rico, on the other hand, seems to be reactionary, and the result of a lack of 
access to immediate recovery aid. This is similar to definitions of resilience that stress the 
importance of bouncing back, and not necessarily addressing vulnerabilities (Pelling, 2003). 
 
7.4 Negotiating recovery and adaptation 
Generally, social contracts are used to establish obligations and responsibilities of 
government to its citizens, as well as the rights and responsibilities of citizens (O’Brien 2012). In 
some cases, social contracts are formalized via ‘on-paper’ commitments that establish what 
actions should and will be taken by whom, and what happens when these commitments are not 
met. In other cases, there is a constant co-production of agreements between people and 
government, or other responsible entities, on what should be expected from each under certain 
circumstances. After Maria, those responsible for recovery included municipal, state, and federal 
entities. This informal agreement is essential when thinking about post-disaster recovery, as this 
period is often one of confusion about responsibility for restoring normalcy at different levels. 
Both community interviews and government documents point to Hurricane Maria as a window of 
opportunity to reimagine physical and social systems and potentially create a new ‘social 
contract’ to ensure stability given the risks associated with climate change. Reflections on 
Hurricane Maria also recognize it as a pivotal point for Puerto Rico in reconstructing both built 
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systems as well as social and economic ones (Rodriguez-Diaz, 2017). Although the island’s long-
term plan emphasizes new and innovative infrastructure along with new economic strategies, 
these plans must account for underlying challenges. One major challenge is funding, which the 
island has solicited from the United States government to pay for reconstruction. In recognizing 
that relying on federal funding limits the island in how aid can be spent, official documents point 
to non-governmental organizations and private sector partners as potential partners for recovery. 
However, some scholars argue that privatizing as a form of integrating environmental efforts with 
economy is detrimental to cultural autonomy and local well-being (Escobar, 2001).     
While the resulting “agreement” of recovery is important, the ways in which it comes 
about also merit attention (Hajer,1995). Specifically, there are several entities shaping the scope 
of responsibility and authority in recovery. The government of Puerto Rico as well as the federal 
government can be considered the main actors in coordinating recovery efforts at the island level 
since these were and still are the entities coordinating relief and reconstruction. However, from 
community interviews and recovery documents, it is clear that non-governmental organizations 
and communities are also shaping recovery during a time when it is unclear if obligations will be 
met by the government. There is no doubt that Hurricane Maria marked a significant upset in 
stability for everyone in Puerto Rico. Some researchers suggest that this event will play a central 
role in defining responsibilities that the U.S. has to Puerto Rico and vice versa, given the island’s 
existing fiscal challenges (Draitser, 2016). Although some research suggests disasters create a 
“blank slate”, Puerto Rico’s unique history with the United States and vulnerabilities present 
before Hurricane Maria might affect just how much the island can start fresh (Agrawal, 2011). 
Despite this, recovery documents show an eagerness to re-negotiate the current political 
arrangement currently in place between the United States and Puerto Rico. 
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CHAPTER 8 
LIMITATIONS 
This research was conducted with the purpose of uncovering perspectives of recovery as 
ways of conceptualizing a new social contract around climate adaptation using the case of 
Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico. However, in doing so it recognizes that these perspectives of 
vulnerability and adaptive capacity are greatly shaped by a particular context (Grothmann & Patt, 
2005). Hurricane Maria played a significant role in shifting conversation around climate 
adaptation in Puerto Rico and even exposed potential new arrangements for stability in the 
island’s relationship with the United States. However, these new arrangements should be 
considered within the entire scope of Puerto Rico’s sociopolitical and ecological history. 
Although this study represents a snapshot in time, further research could expand upon this major 
shift by considering formal agreements such as the laws and policies which makeup Puerto Rico’s 
current political arrangement with the United State and the uncertainties associated with future 
climate impacts on the island. The scope of this study was based on the relevance of Hurricane 
Maria as a major disaster and a clear source of instability on the island for years to come. That 
said, widening that scope to include more analysis of the island’s capacity for adaptation 
considering its unique political structure and unique vulnerability to climate risks could provide 
more enriching examination of climate adaptation in Puerto Rico. 
 
  50 
CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS 
The period after a major disaster involves identifying and neutralizing specific threats like 
complete loss of electricity and water services.  Addressing these types of threats and others after 
a disaster does require some technological and managerial resources like investing in robust 
emergency aid and better infrastructure. However, these approaches are not enough when 
considering the underlying vulnerabilities that produce hazards and risks for populations affected 
by a disaster event. Digging deeper into how disasters are survived and managed by individuals as 
well as governments speaks to wider processes of adaptation and how social, political, and 
economic systems can be challenged to reduce vulnerability and promote transformative change. 
In Puerto Rico, both the government as well as local perspectives show an intent to transform the 
island’s broken social and physical systems, however there is a disconnect in deciding who should 
be taking transformative actions. This may stem from an underlying mistrust of political systems 
which is shown both by the Corcovada resident’s reluctance to rely on state and federal aid, as 
well as the government of Puerto Rico’s reluctance to accept the current political arrangement 
with the United States. While this study focused on broad perspectives of adaptation, a narrower 
emphasis on who is involved in recovery and adaptation could provide more context for decision-
making after Maria and in the long-term. This could be done by exploring the governance of 
disaster recovery in Puerto Rico to understand the policy structures that will affect adaptation. 
The emerging “agreement” surrounding recovery post-Maria can be considered a co-
production of a contract between the government and citizens of Puerto Rico to establish a plan 
that produces successful outcomes both locally and for the island as a whole. However, to extend 
the current understanding of a new agreement beyond recovery after Hurricane Maria, more 
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research should be extended to study views regarding what responsibilities each have, where to 
prioritize action, and what an ideal long-term recovery should look like. This could be done by 
focusing on imagining future climate scenarios given Puerto Rico’s unique geographical and 
social context. 
Narratives from the Corcovada community demonstrate a structured network of aid and 
support that has been established over decades. This network has allowed them to address 
vulnerabilities related to water and energy. In addition, economic, political, and infrastructural 
instability across the island has become something that the community can account for in their 
decision-making and has made them more adaptable to face threats such as Maria. Their ability to 
adopt a transformative approach to reducing vulnerabilities is not mirrored in the government’s 
approach to recovery and adaptation, however. Long-term plans are described as transformative in 
recovery documents, but only address the island’s biggest physical and economic risks by 
investing more into the existing energy grid structures and expanding funding sources to include 
entities outside of local and federal government. Recovery plans recommend statehood as a 
possible solution to issues faced by the island in receiving aid, which could signal a major 
governance and policy-making shift on the island.  
Perspectives of adaptation outlined both in the Corcovada community as well as in 
government documents show that the island will have to confront major vulnerabilities at many 
scales to better prepare for future disasters and other instability caused by climate change.  
Understanding these separate-but-linked narratives on recovery is a first step in mapping out 
which actions are necessary to maintain stability, and how these will affect the island and its 
residents.   
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López Marrero, T., & Wisner, B. (2012). Not in the Same Boat: Disasters and Differential 
Vulnerability in the Insular Caribbean. Caribbean Studies, 40(2), 129-168. 
 
Lydia DePillis. (2017). Puerto Rico's pension system was in crisis. Hurricane Maria made it 
into a catastrophe. CNN Wire, p. CNN Wire, Oct 5, 2017. 
 
Manyena, S. (2006). The concept of resilience revisited. Disasters,30(4), 434-450 
 
Manyena, S.B. (2013). Disaster event: Window of opportunity to implement global disaster 
policies? Jàmbá : Journal of Disaster Risk Studies, 5(1), E1-E10 
 
Miliband, D. 2006. The great stink: towards an environmental contract. Audit Commission 
Annual Lecture, London, UK. 19 July 2006.  
 
O'Brien, G., O'Keefe, P., Rose, J., & Wisner, B. (2006). Climate change and disaster 
management. Disasters, 30(1), 64-80. 
 
O'Brien, K., Hayward, B., & Berkes, F. (2009). Rethinking Social Contracts: Building Resilience 
in a Changing Climate. Ecology and Society, 14(2), [n.] 
 
O'Brien, K., & Selboe, E. (2015). Social Transformation: The Real Adaptive Challenge. In The 
Adaptive Challenge of Climate Change (pp. 311-324). Cambridge University Press 
 
Office of the Governor of Puerto Rico (2017). Governor Roselló Nevares announces the creation 
of the Center for Emergency Operations. Retrieved from : 
https://www.fortaleza.pr.gov/content/gobernador-rossell-nevares-anuncia-el-
establecimiento-del-centro-conjunto-de-operaciones. 
 
Pelling, M., & Dill, K. (2010). Disaster politics: Tipping points for change in the adaptation of 
sociopolitical regimes. Progress in Human Geography, 34(1), 21-37. 
 
Pelling, M., O'brien, K., & Matyas, D. (2015). Adaptation and transformation. Climatic Change, 
133(1), 113-127. 
 
Pelling, Mark. (2011). Adaptation to Climate Change: From Resilience to Transformation. 
Taylor & Francis. 
 
Pelling, M. (2003). The vulnerability of cities natural disasters and social resilience. Sterling, 
Va.: Earthscan Publications. 
 
Ramsey, Muñoz-Erickson, Mélendez-Ackerman, Nytch, Branoff, & Carrasquillo-Medrano. (2019). 
Overcoming barriers to knowledge integration for urban resilience: A knowledge systems 
  55 
analysis of two-flood prone communities in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Environmental Science 
and Policy, 99, 48-57 
 
Schlosberg, D., Collins, L., & Niemeyer, S. (2017). Adaptation policy and community discourse: 
Risk, vulnerability, and just transformation. Environmental Politics, 26(3), 413-437. 
 
Tierney, K., Bruneau, M., 2007. Conceptualizing and measuring resilience: a key to disaster loss 
reduction. TR News May–June, 14–17 
 
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), Sendai Framework for 
Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, United Nations, Geneva, Switzerland, 2015. 
 
“U.S. Insular Areas Application of the U.S. Constitution”, GAO Nov 1997 Report, p. 24.  
 
United States. Congress. House. Committee on Natural Resources, issuing body. (2017). 
Examining Challenges in Puerto Rico's Recovery and the Role of the Financial Oversight 
and Management Board. 
 
United States. Congress. House. Committee on Natural Resources, author. (2018). Management 
crisis at the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority and implications for recovery : Oversight 
hearing before the Committee on Natural Resources, U.S. House of Representatives, One 
Hundred Fifteenth Congress, second session, Wednesday, July 25, 2018 
 
Vale, L., & Campanella, T. (2005). The Resilient City : How Modern Cities Recover from 
Disaster. Cary: Oxford University Press USA - OSO. 
 
Vick, Karl. (2017). How the U.S. Turned Its Back on Puerto Rico. Time, 190(14), Time, Oct 9, 
2017, Vol.190(14). 
 
Vives, R. (2017, Sep. 28) Puerto Rico’s debt-plagued power grid was on life support long 
before the hurricanes wiped it out. Los Angeles Times. Web. 
 
Walker, B., C. S. Holling, S. R. Carpenter, and A. Kinzig. 2004. Resilience, adaptability 
and transformability in social-ecological systems. Ecology and Society 9(2): 5. [online] 
URL: http://www. ecologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss2/art5/  
 
Willison, C., Singer, P., Creary, M., & Greer, S. (2019). Quantifying inequities in US federal 
response to hurricane disaster in Texas and Florida compared with Puerto Rico. BMJ Global 
Health, 4(1), E001191. 
 
Wisner, Ben. (2004). At risk : Natural hazards, people's vulnerability and 
disasters (2nd ed.). Routledge ; New York: Routledge. 
  56 
APPENDIX A 
[IRB EXEMPTION] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  57 
 
 
EXEMPTION GRANTED 
 
David Manuel-Navarrete 
Sustainability, School of  
Dear David Manuel-Navarrete: 
On 7/12/2018 the ASU IRB reviewed the following protocol: 
Type of Review: Initial Study 
Title: Assessing the Role of Perception for Adaptive Capacity in Post-
Hurricane Maria Puerto Rico 
Investigator: David Manuel-Navarrete 
IRB ID: STUDY00008371 
Funding: None 
Grant Title: None 
Grant ID: None 
Documents 
Reviewed: 
• Social Behavioral Protocol_OrtizJessica.docx, Category: IRB 
Protocol; 
• Ortiz_Consent_letterhead.pdf, Category: Consent Form; 
• Interview Questions.pdf, Category: Measures (Survey 
questions/Interview questions /interview guides/focus group 
questions); 
• citiCompletionReport5204526 (1).pdf, Category: Non-ASU human 
subjects training (if taken within last 3 years to grandfather in); 
• Verbal Consent Script.pdf, Category: Consent Form; 
The IRB determined that the protocol is considered exempt pursuant to Federal 
Regulations 45CFR46 (2) Tests, surveys, interviews, or observation on 7/12/2018.  
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APPENDIX B 
[MAP OF CORCOVADA LOCATION] 
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      APPENDIX C 
[INTERVIEW PROTOCOL] 
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Interview Questions: “Assessing Perception of Adaptive Capacity in Post-Hurricane 
Maria Puerto Rico” 
Jessica Ortiz, MA Sustainability 
 
1. Background Information 
a. Please introduce yourself, describing your family, home, and work. 
b. How long have you been living in this community? 
c. Describe the everyday experience of yourself and your family in this community 
 
2. Experience of Hurricane Maria 
a. Describe your experience in the days leading up to the hurricane and during the storm 
both at your house with your family and things you experienced in the community. 
 
3. Perceived capacity of recovery entities 
a. What were there government actions you observed leading up to/during/after the 
hurricane? 
b. What were these actions focused on, in your opinion? 
c. Were these actions consistent with previous issues of national concern? 
 
4. Material and social resources 
a. What did you do to prepare for the hurricane, if anything? What resources did you have 
at home, in your community, or from the government? 
b. Did members of your community do things differently than you? Did they have 
different resources 
available to them? 
 
5. Perception of successful recovery 
a. Do you think you had enough resources, time, and information to prepare for the 
storm? 
b. Do you think you were well-prepared? Why or why not? 
c. How would you describe your ability to recover from the storm? 
**Do you have anything else to add that you think is important? 
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APPENDIX D 
 
[ABBREVIATED CODEBOOK] 
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Code Description Examples 
Forward-thinking 
 
Sub codes:  
Improving energy and 
water systems, 
creating external 
networks, creating 
educational 
opportunities, 
innovation 
This is a capacity to plan 
for future vulnerable 
situations and reduce 
chronic vulnerabilities. In 
the community, this is 
shown in both post-
hurricane recovery through 
physical infrastructure, as 
well as during normal 
times by making sure the 
baseline material and 
social needs of the 
community are met.   
“If we could put solar [panel] 
units on our houses and for our 
aqueduct system, we wouldn’t 
have to worry.”[Interview] 
 
“The community did things 
other than the aqueduct, too. 
We created the computer 
center, we started offering 
English classes.” [Interview] 
Self-organization 
 
Sub codes: 
Community input, 
care for neighbors, 
community work, 
FEMA meetings, 
external networks, 
sharing resources, 
flexibility 
This is a capacity of the 
community to bring 
together social and 
material resources from 
inside and outside of 
Corcovada. The 
cornerstone of this 
organization is the 
Committee who hold 
weekly meetings, identify 
resources and networks to 
help the community, and 
manage the community’s 
local aqueduct system.  
“It’s just organization. It’s 
putting aside the “I” and all of 
us getting to work. If I have to 
move a tree at my house, it’s 
not just me doing it. 5 more 
people show up. It’s mutual 
help, and that’s important to 
have.” [Interview] 
 
“We’re preparing with gas, 
diesel, everything except for 
water, we have that already. We 
have a new generator to power 
the aqueduct just in case.”  
Recovery entities 
 
Sub codes: 
Corcovada, municipal 
government, Governor 
Roselló, NGO’s, 
COR3, FEMA, 
diaspora, church, god, 
federal government, 
U.S. Congress, Trump 
Administration 
 
 
 
 
 
These are people and other 
entities that are involved 
with recovery.  
“She handles the people from 
FEMA, and well it’s been a 
year and they are still giving us 
a hand with some things, with 
technical services and all of 
that.” 
 
“The task is ahead is as 
daunting as it is urgent, and 
recovery cannot be 
accomplished unless Puerto 
Rico receives substantial 
federal assistance.”[Build Back 
Better PR] 
Vulnerabilities 
 
These are conditions 
identified by the 
community and in official 
“The main problem that we 
have is if the energy goes out, if 
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Sub codes: energy 
grid, laws and 
policies, PROMESA, 
geographic location, 
infrastructure damage, 
older residents, lack of 
financial resources 
documents as exacerbating 
hurricane damage. They 
are physical vulnerabilities 
such as geographic 
location, social 
vulnerabilities such as 
Puerto Rico’s 
commonwealth status, and 
economic such as having 
access to emergency 
funding. 
the water pumps aren’t powered 
then we don’t have water.” 
 
“...aid from other states was not 
readily available due to lack of 
mutual assistance compacts and 
the geographical separation of 
more than 1,000 miles between 
Puerto Rico and the continental 
United States”[Transformation 
and Innovation] 
 
Hurricane damage 
 
Sub codes: fleeing 
Puerto Rico, housing, 
agriculture, water 
infrastructure, energy 
infrastructure, 
economy, roads, 
communication 
networks, livelihoods 
lost, death, 
pharmaceutical 
industry 
 
These are physical and 
non-physical damages of 
the hurricane mentioned in 
interviews and documents. 
Physical include damage to 
housing, built 
infrastructure, and 
ecological mainly in the 
form of agriculture. An 
example of a non-physical 
damage is having to 
abandon Puerto Rico. 
 
“...tens of thousands of Puerto 
Ricans left the island to escape 
their post-hurricane hardships” 
 
“All of that there was our corn 
field. It didn’t leave a single 
branch or tree, nothing, 
nothing, nothing. That quenepa 
tree, that was the prettiest 
thing.” 
 
 
   
 
